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Impact of critical mass on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games
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We study the evolution of cooperation under the assumption that the collective benefits of group membership
can only be harvested if the fraction of cooperators within the group, i.e. their critical mass, exceeds a threshold
value. Considering structured populations, we show that a moderate fraction of cooperators can prevail even at
very low multiplication factors if the critical mass is minimal. For larger multiplication factors, however, the
level of cooperation is highest at an intermediate value of the critical mass. The latter is robust to variations
of the group size and the interaction network topology. Applying the optimal critical mass threshold, we show
that the fraction of cooperators in public goods games is significantly larger than in the traditional linear model,
where the produced public good is proportional to the fraction of cooperators within the group.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 87.23.Kg, 87.23.Ge
The emergence of cooperation among selfish individuals
within the framework of evolutionary game theory is an in-
tensively studied problem [1]. While the prisoner’s dilemma,
snowdrift and the stag-hunt games typically entail pairwise
interactions, the public goods game traditionally considers
larger groups of interacting players [2]. Essentially, however,
all mentioned social dilemmas can consider either pairwise or
group interactions, as was suggested in Refs. [3, 4]. Indeed,
it is expected that the possibility of multi-player interactions
can bring about phenomena that cannot be observed in case of
pairwise interactions, especially when the underlying topol-
ogy of players is structured rather than well-mixed [5, 6].
In the classical public goods game setup, individuals en-
gage in multi-player interactions and decide whether they
wish to contribute (cooperate) or not (defect) to the common
pool. The accumulated contributions, equalling one each, are
summoned and multiplied by a factor large than one, i.e. the
so-called multiplication factor, due to synergy effects of coop-
eration. Subsequently, the resulting assets are shared equally
among all group members, irrespective of their initial con-
tribution to the common pool [7]. Although the benefits of
mutual cooperation, especially if compared to individual or
independent cooperative efforts, are widely accepted, they do
not apply in all situations. More specifically, the accumu-
lated public good doesn’t always depend proportionally on
the fraction of cooperators within the group. In the begin-
ning the start-up costs need to be absorbed and offset, there-
fore decimating the expected return to the initial contributors.
On the other hand, when the output limit of a joint venture
approaches, the impact of additional contributors becomes
marginal [8] In extreme situations the sparse occurrence of
cooperators in the group makes it impossible to produce pub-
lic goods. Instead, a minimal number of cooperative contrib-
utors is required, i.e. the so-called “critical mass”, to elicit
the full advantage of group action. There exist several real-
life examples supporting such a binary outcome assumption.
For example, the building of a bridge (or something that is of
value to the majority) within a community requires a certain
minimal fraction of supporters. However, if the critical mass
of those is not reached, all good aims will go to waste. Group
hunting of predators can also be mentioned as an example of a
“gain all-or-nothing” activity. In this work we explore how the
size of the critical mass within a group influences the global
level of cooperation in a society where the relations between
players are defined by spatial interactions [9].
In the studied public goods game players occupy the nodes
of an interaction graph where, for simplicity, every node has
the same degree z. The focal player forms a group of size
G = z + 1 with its nearest neighbors, although the group
size can be extended by considering more distant neighbors as
well. Importantly, each player belongs to G different groups,
as it is illustrated in Ref. [10]. Initially every player on site
x is designated either as a defector (sx = 0) or cooperator
(sx = 1) with equal probability. The total payoff Px of player
x is the sum of partial payoffs Px,i, which are collected from
groups around every focal player i where x is also a member
(x ∈ Gi). Such a payoff is given by
Px,i =


r˜G− sx, if TH ≤
∑
j∈Gi
sj
−sx, otherwise
, (1)
where r˜ = r/G is the normalized multiplication factor origi-
nating from the synergy effects of mutual cooperation, and the
sum runs over all the players j that are members of the group
centered around the focal player i. Here 1 ≤ TH ≤ G denotes
the threshold value of the critical mass. More precisely, group
members can benefit from the joint venture only if the number
of cooperators within a group is equal or exceeds this thresh-
old. In the opposite case the cooperators loose their invest-
ments while the defectors gain nothing. A similar assumption
was made in earlier works, where the evolution of cooperation
in well-mixed populations was studied [4, 11]. There a group
of players G is chosen randomly, and the mentioned threshold
condition is introduced to harvest collective benefits. Due to
this a new fixed point emerges where cooperators and defec-
tors can coexist. Souza et al. [4] have shown that the fraction
of cooperators in the coexistence regime increases with the
critical mass. In our case, however, the possibility of repeated
interactions within the realm of structured populations yields
a different threshold dependence of the cooperation level, as
we will report below.
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FIG. 1: (color online) Comparative plots of benefit functions in de-
pendence on the fraction of cooperators within a group. The dotted
green “S”-shaped curve corresponds to the actual profile [8], while
the linear dependence (dashed blue line) is the one assumed most
frequently in public goods games. The step-like gain all-or noth-
ing function (red solid line) is used at present, where group benefits
can be harvested only if the critical mass of cooperators exceeds the
threshold value (TH/G). For comparisons, all functions are normal-
ized by their maximal values.
To visualize the impact of introducing the critical mass
threshold, it is instructive to compare different profiles of ac-
tually produced public goods in dependence on the fraction
of cooperators within a given group, as shown in Fig. 1. Most
commonly, the produced public good is assumed to be directly
proportional with the number of cooperators, thus yielding a
linear profile (dashed blue line). However, Marwell et al. and
Heckathorn [8] argued that such a relation is not necessarily
in agreement with actual observations, and that in fact an “S”-
shaped dependence (dotted green line) is much more fitting
to reality. The introduction of critical mass yields a simplifi-
cation, or rather an extreme version of the latter dependence,
giving rise to a step-like function (solid red line) going from
zero to the maximal value at the threshold (TH/G in Fig. 1).
The saturation beyond the threshold accounts for the fact that
the growth of cooperators may not necessarily lead to an en-
hanced social welfare.
Primarily applied interaction graphs are the square (z = 4)
and the triangle lattice (z = 6), the two being representa-
tive for networks having zero and nonzero clustering coeffi-
cient, although our observations were tested on random reg-
ular graphs having z = 4 as well. Different group sizes G
are also considered, which we will specify when presenting
the results. The applied system size ranged from 104 − 106
players. Following the standard dynamics of spatial models,
during an elementary Monte Carlo step a player x and one
of its neighbors y are selected randomly. After calculating
their payoffs Px and Py as described above, player x tries
to enforce its strategy sx on player y in accordance with the
probability W (sx → sy) = 1/{1 + exp[(Py − Px)/K]},
where K > 0 is a noise parameter describing the uncertainty
by strategy adoptions [5]. As is natural, better performing
strategies are adopted with a large probability, although at
nonzero values of K strategies performing poorly can spread
too. In what follows we will use a fixed value of K = 0.5
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FIG. 2: (color online) Fraction of cooperators as a function of the
normalized multiplication factor r/G for different threshold values.
The outcome of the linear model is shown as well. The interaction
graph was a square lattice with G = 5.
without loss of generality. As it was previously shown, the
introduction of multi-player interactions gives rise to a ro-
bust topology-independent noise dependence of the cooper-
ation level [12]. During a Monte Carlo step (MCS) all play-
ers will have a chance to spread their strategy once on aver-
age. The typical relaxation period was up to 2 · 104 MCS
before the stationary fraction of cooperators (fC) was evalu-
ated, although substantially faster relaxation times were also
observed, as will be described below.
It is important to note that the introduction of critical mass
results in a setup that is different from the so-called threshold
public goods game [13]. In the latter case, players are pro-
vided with an endowment and subsequently they must decide
how much of that to contribute for the provision of a public
good. If the sum of all contributions reaches a threshold, each
individual receives a reward. Here, the cooperators contribute
a fixed amount, whereafter the constitution of the group deter-
mines whether their initial input will be exalted or go to waste.
Moreover, threshold public goods games were studied only in
well-mixed or single-group populations.
Starting with the basic setup entailing the square lattice with
G = 5, we present the fraction of cooperators (fC) as a func-
tion of r for different threshold values in Fig. 2. First, it can be
observed that using a minimal critical mass for the threshold
(TH = 1), it is possible to sustain a small fraction of coop-
erators even if the multiplication factor is extremely low [for
comparison, note that defectors always dominate completely
below r/G = 0.7 (see Fig. 3 in Ref. [12]) when the linear
model is used]. At such low r values, the modest total amount
of produced public goods is supplied by a single cooperator
within every group. Consequently, the frequency of coop-
erators is proportional to G−2 (one cooperator per G-sized
group, whereby every cooperator is a member of G groups).
Secondly however, when r is increased, the advantage of ag-
gregated cooperators can be utilized more efficiently only at
larger threshold values (TH > 1). Yet the increase in the
overall cooperation level for intermediate values of r cannot
be sustained if the critical mass becomes too high, thus sug-
gesting the existence of an optimal threshold for the evolution
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FIG. 3: (color online) Fraction of cooperators as a function of the
normalized threshold value TH/G for different group sizes and
interaction graphs (SQR=square lattice; TRI=triangular lattice) at
r/G = 0.6. Note that the normalization of TH and r with G is
essential for relevant comparisons.
of cooperation.
To explore the robustness of our observations we have also
used larger group sizes G, thereby gaining the advantageous
possibility of fine-tuning the threshold value more precisely.
Specifically, the applied group sizes were G = 9, 13 and 25
for the square lattice, and G = 7, 13 and 19 for the triangu-
lar lattice. Figure 3 shows the results, indicating clearly the
existence of an optimal intermediate critical mass for which
the cooperation level is highest, independently from the group
size or the underlying interaction graph.
The robust existence of an optimal critical mass can be ex-
plained if we distinguish cooperators based on whether their
initial contributions are exalted, hence increasing the pro-
duced public good, or go to waste. Depending on this, we
designate cooperators accordingly as being either “active” or
“inactive”. An inactive cooperator is always vulnerable in
the presence of defectors because the moderate aggregation of
other cooperators in its vicinity is insufficient for spatial reci-
procity to work [1]. This happens frequently if the threshold
is set too high, having as the inevitable consequence the fast
extinction of the cooperative strategy. In the opposite limit,
i.e. when the threshold is very low, practically all cooperators
are active. Then, however, the cooperators don’t have a strong
incentive to aggregate because an increase in their density will
not notably elevate their individual fitness. Consequently, in
this case only a moderate fraction of cooperators coexists with
the prevailing defectors. At intermediate thresholds the status
of cooperators may vary depending on their location on the
graph. In particular, there are places where their local den-
sity exceeds the threshold, and thus the cooperators there are
active. These cooperators can prevail efficiently against defec-
tors. Yet there are also places where the cooperators are inac-
tive because their density is locally insufficient. In these areas
defectors can easily defeat cooperators. Importantly, however,
after the initial reconfigurations the emerging domains of ac-
tive cooperators start spreading prolifically in the sea of defec-
tors and are ultimately victorious. The final cooperation level
obviously depends also on the multiplication factor, whereby
this dependence is similar as was reported in previous works
FIG. 4: (color online) Time evolution (from left to right) of an
identical random initial state on a square lattice having G = 25
for TH = 2 (top row), 17 (middle row) and 22 (bottom row), at
r/G = 0.6. Black are defectors, while white and yellow (light grey)
are active and inactive cooperators, respectively. Note that the partly
different coloring in the first column is due to the differences in sta-
tus of some cooperators appearing as a consequence of different TH
values. All panels show a 100 × 100 excerpt of a larger 400 × 400
lattice.
employing the linear public goods function [9, 12].
Figure 4 demonstrates the preceding argumentation effec-
tively. It shows how the system evolves for three different rep-
resentative threshold values on a square lattice with G = 25.
The thresholds are TH = 2 (top row), 17 (middle row) and
22 (bottom row). Time evolution goes from the left towards
the right snapshots, starting with the random initial state and
ending with the stationary state. Black color is used for de-
fectors, while white and yellow depict active and inactive co-
operators, respectively. It is interesting to note that, despite
appearances, the leftmost panels depicting the initial state are
completely identical (exactly the same random initial condi-
tions were used). Importantly, however, the application of
different threshold values yields an adverse classification of
cooperators on those that are active (white) and those that are
inactive (yellow), which obviously has an impressive impact
on the final state (compare the rightmost snapshots).
When the threshold is low (top row of Fig. 4) practically
all cooperators are active, thus supplying their groups with
the maximal payoff. As we have argued above, in this case
a higher density of cooperators would not be advantageous.
Therefore the active cooperators (colored white) don’t aggre-
gate. Of course, the stationary fraction of cooperators de-
pends on the actual value of TH, whereby interestingly the
resulting cooperation level is larger than the applied thresh-
old value. The difference between fC and TH/G becomes
relevant when TH approaches the optimal value. If the im-
posed critical mass is too high (bottom row of Fig. 4), the
vast majority of cooperators becomes inactive (colored yel-
low). Despite the fact that the interactions amongst players
are structured, i.e. the underlying graph is a lattice, the spatial
reciprocity cannot work and thus the cooperators go extinct
4very fast (around 102 MCSs suffice to get an absorbing D
phase even for large system sizes). The leftmost bottom snap-
shot shows clearly that only a tiny fraction of nearby coopera-
tors can initially exceed the necessary threshold (small white
area). However, they cannot propagate because their spread-
ing would require too many defectors changing their strategy
in the vicinity of the border. Oppositely, the strategy change
of a single active cooperator can easily decrease their density
below the critical mass threshold, which leads the defectors to
full dominance, as shown in the rightmost bottom snapshot.
In the intermediate threshold region (middle row of Fig. 4),
we can observe a fast extinction of inactive cooperators. Be-
cause of the moderate critical mass, however, a new phe-
nomenon emerges. Active cooperators (colored white) can
easily protect themselves against the invasion, and more im-
portantly still, they can also alter their neighborhoods and
therefore spread in the sea of defectors. Eventually this pro-
cess results in a highly cooperative stationary state, as shown
in the rightmost middle snapshot. In fact, the introduction of
an intermediate critical mass paves the way for spatial reci-
procity to work extremely effectively, leading to the selection
of the most beneficial state in the course of the evolution. If
compared to the extinction of inactive cooperators the men-
tioned process is slower because it relies on a propagation
mechanism. From the defector’s point of view, however, the
negative feedback effect due to their own spreading is more
severe than in the traditional linear public goods game (see
dashed blue line in Fig. 1). In particular, while in the presently
proposed critical mass model the invasion of defectors may
result in a sudden loss of collective benefits, the linear model
always ensures a small amount of public goods in the vicinity
of cooperators. This is why the fraction of defectors remains
at a very low level, even for small multiplication factors, if the
optimal critical mass threshold is imposed.
In sum, we have shown that the evolution of cooperation in
spatial public goods games can be promoted effectively, even
at unfavorable conditions (i.e. low r values), via the intro-
duction of critical mass acting as a threshold for initial con-
tributions to the common pool. In contrast with well-mixed
populations, here the impact of critical mass is optimal at
an intermediate value of the threshold, which allows spatial
reciprocity to work more effectively than in the linear pub-
lic goods game. Notably, the optimal critical mass was found
to be robust against variations in the group size and the un-
derlying interaction network. The revealed mechanism for
the promotion of cooperation can be understood by taking
into account the binary (active/inactive) impact of coopera-
tors, which emerges spontaneously depending on their local
density. In future studies, it will be interesting to investigate
how locally diverse values of critical mass influence the global
level of cooperation, and more generally, if and how a coevo-
lutionary model [14], where besides the strategy adoptions of
players groups will also be able to adopt the critical threshold
value from a more successful community, can be devised so
that the optimal thresholds are selected naturally.
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